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19431

NOTES AND COMMENTS

restrict the operation of the rule that evidence illegally obtained is
inadmissible, is apparent. Evidence secured through illegal search
and seizure has been held admissible where no application for return was made prior to trial. Youngblood v. United States, 266 Fed.
795, 797 (C.C.A. 8th, 1920), McMann v. Engel, 16 F. Supp. 446, 448
(S.D.N.Y. 1936), 87 F. (2d) 377 (C.C.A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied, 301
U.S. 684 (1937); where the search and seizure is made by a third
party not acting in collusion with federal officers, Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921); where illegal search and seizure is
made by a state officer, United States v. Falloco, 277 Fed. 75, 81
(W.D.Mo. 1922); where illegal search and seizure was made on premises not owned or occupied by defendant, MacDaniel v. United States,
294 Fed. 769, 771 (C.C.A. 6th, 1924). Search and seizure with consent of party-defendant is not within the rule, Dillon v. United States,
279 Fed. 639 (C.C.A. 2d, 1921); where defendant is not the party
against whom the illegal search and seizure was made, Connolly V.
Medalie, 28 F. (2d) 629, 630 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932).
Evidence obtained by the modern method of wire tapping was
first held to be admissible as not being a search and seizure in violation of the FOURTH AMEINDMENT. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
The act of wire tapping was made illegal by 48
438, 464, (1928).
STAT. 1103 (1934) 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1941), and evidence thus obtained
was declared to be inadmissible. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S.
379, 381 (1937). Any evidence derived from or made accessible by
the act of wire tapping was held to be inadmissible. Nardone v.
Evidence from wire tapUnited States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
ping was held inadmissible although consent to the interception was
given by one party to the communication, United States v. Polakoff,
112 F. (2d) 888 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) cert. denied, 311 U.S. 653 (1940),
Note (1941) 16 Ind. L.J. 412.
In the instant case, there are indications that the courts are to
construe illegal wire tapping just as any other illegal search and
seizure in violation of a party's constitutional rights, subject to all
the exceptions and limitations which have attached to the law as set
forth in Weeks v. United States, supra, until such time as it is recognized that public policy is not served by permitting the fact of an
illegal search and seizure to prevent the introduction at the trial of
indispensable evidence in the state's case. The path of effective law
enforcement is one to be facilitated rather than obstructed.

LEGISLATION
SPECIAL MUNICIPAL ELECTION

LAWS

The legislature enacted a statute which postponed elections of
officials for all cities and school cities in the state except those
of the first class. The statute was attacked as a violation of constitutional provisions forbidding special legislation. Held, the act was
special in violation of the constitution. Ettinger et al. v. Studevent,
Hole et al. v. Dice, -Ind.-, 38 N.E. (2d) 1000 (1942).
The Indiana Legislature is forbidden to enact special laws on
17 enumerated subjects, and special legislation cannot be enacted in
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any case where a general law could be made applicable, IND. CONST.
Art. IV, § 23. Special acts regulating municipal elections are not expressly forbidden; thus the present statute, Ch. 86, Acts 1941, IND.
STAT. ANN. (Burns, Supp. 1942) HI 29-1813 et seq., can be invalidated
only on the grounds that a general law could be made applicable.
Under the doctrine of Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409 (1868), and a
long line of cases which followed it, Indianapolis v. Navin, 151 Ind.
139, 47 N.E. 525 (1898); Mode v. Beasley, 143 Ind. 306, 42 N.E. 727
(1895); State v. Kolsem, 130 Ind. 434, 29 N.E. 595 (1891). Contra:
Thomas v. Clay County, 5 Ind. 4 (1854); Fountain Park v. Hensler,
199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465 (1926): the legislature was the sole judge
of whether or not a general law could be applicable. This doctrine,
however, was forsaken for the view that the matter was a proper
subject of judicial review. Heckler v. Conter, 206 Ind. 376, 187 N.E.
878 (1933). But see Groves v. Lake County, 209 Ind. 371, 199 N.E.
137 (1936). This more recent and better stand is followed by) the court
in the present case.
It has been generally held that subjects may be classified for
legislative purposes as long as (1) the classification is reasonable,
Fountain Park v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465 (1926); Longview
v. City of Crawfordsville, 164 Ind. 117, 73 N.E. 78 (1904); and (2)
the act is applicable to all within the class, Spencer v. Knight, 177
Ind. 564, 98 N.E. 342 (1911); Strange v. Board of County Comrs.,
173 Ind. 640, 91 N.E. 242 (1910). It is further held that the limits of
the class must not be such as to exclude others fronY the class forever.
Rosenoranz v. Evansville, 194 Ind. 499, 143 N.E. 593 (1923). However, the fact that there is at the time of enactment only one city
within the class does not render the act invalid. Bumb v. Evansville,
168 Ind. 272, 80 N.E. 625 (1907).
In the past the court has not been consistent where the problem
of special legislation has been involved, and the result is almost
hopeless confusion. Horack, Special Legislation: Another Twilight
Zone (1936) 12 IND. T. J. 109, 183.
The court refers to both section 22 and 23 but fails to distinguish between them in regard to applicability here. Since section
22 is not involved, the real issue is whether or not a general law
could be made applicable, and this problem is virtually ignored. The
court contents itself with saying that the act is invalid because the
bases of the classification are arbitrary. It is unfortunate that the
connection between this fact and the problem of whether a general
law could be made applicable was not clearly shown.
However, it is submitted that the result in the present case
is a correct one. As the court said, the classification was arbitrary,
i.e., it had no connection with the purpose of the act. It seems clear
that a general law could be made applicable, and the act contravenes
section 23 of the constitution.

